diff --git a/docs/BUG_HISTORY.md b/docs/BUG_HISTORY.md index f0ceecc40..5bf1d90b6 100644 --- a/docs/BUG_HISTORY.md +++ b/docs/BUG_HISTORY.md @@ -27620,6 +27620,7 @@ - 头像上传的服务端(界面在 BUG-2059):浏览器把图裁成不超过 256 × 256 的正方形小图再上传,原图不离开设备。`PUT / GET / DELETE /api/account/avatar/image`:只收 JPEG 和 WebP,类型和尺寸从文件自己的开头字节读,不看文件名和浏览器报的类型;上限 200 KB,边读边数;每小时最多 10 次。图片存在数据库新表 `profile_avatar_images`(迁移 `20261120100000_profile_avatar_images.sql`,可重复执行),只有本人能读写删,后台角色没有权限;数据库备份自动包含;注销账号时由现有清理流程和级联删除一并删掉。账户数据只多一个 `avatarImage`(版本号),不带图片字节。 - 验证与防复发:`frontend/tests/credits-groundwork-2057.test.ts`(13 条:每个流水类型和功能键都有名称;未知的归「其他」并记日志;分页在同一毫秒的多条记录上不重不漏;接口只返回本人的记录和链接;开关关与开时套餐接口和下单接口的行为;改开关需要权限并留审计)。`frontend/tests/database-credit-ledger-2057.test.ts` 用真实表结构验证行级权限,需要 Docker,本机没有跑,要在流水线上确认。`frontend/tests/avatar-image-2057.test.ts`(6 条:类型、尺寸、超限各自的错误码;未登录 401;别人的头像读不到也删不掉;移除;限频;迁移版本唯一且是最新一个)。`database-account-deletion.test.ts` 增加「注销后本人的头像没有了、别人的还在」,同样需要 Docker。BUG-1022 的两条测试和 BUG-1526 的一条测试按原值、新值、原因更新。 - 关联记录:BUG-1022、BUG-1526、BUG-1937、BUG-1939、BUG-1980、BUG-2040。 +- 补充(2026-11-20,推到测试环境后的第一次门禁):门禁失败,没有部署。两处都是这次新写、本机没有 Docker 没跑过的数据库测试:`database-local-business.test.ts` 的全表名单没有加 `profile_avatar_images`;`database-credit-ledger-2057.test.ts` 用还没有切换角色的登录角色去问后台角色的表权限,这个登录角色连 public 都进不去(`permission denied for schema public`)。改成名单加上新表、权限那一问用测试库的管理员身份。顺着这条测试往下核对时发现接口里一处真问题:点数记录用服务端角色去读对话表,而服务端角色对这张表没有任何权限(2026-07-15 的迁移明确收回),读取静默失败,结果是提问那几行没有跳转箭头、合盘追问会被写成普通提问。改成用登录用户自己的身份读对话表(行级权限只给本人的),测试里钉住这一点。迁移没有改动。教训:新增表要同时改全表名单;用服务端角色读一张表之前先查它有没有权限;只在门禁里能跑的测试,第一次推送后要看完门禁再算数。 - 修复版本:`claude/credits-groundwork-2057`。 ## BUG-2056 | 有几处操作的成功或失败还写在页面里,占着布局 diff --git a/frontend/src/app/api/account/credit-ledger/route.ts b/frontend/src/app/api/account/credit-ledger/route.ts index bd1e8195b..07e1f1445 100644 --- a/frontend/src/app/api/account/credit-ledger/route.ts +++ b/frontend/src/app/api/account/credit-ledger/route.ts @@ -132,7 +132,8 @@ export async function GET(request: Request) { if (reservations === null) return NextResponse.json({ error: "暂时无法读取点数记录" }, { status: 500 }); const sessionIds = [...new Set((consultationRequests ?? []).map((row) => row.session_id).filter(isUuid))]; - const sessions = sessionIds.length === 0 ? [] : await rowsOf(admin + // Read as the signed-in user: the service role has no access to this table. + const sessions = sessionIds.length === 0 ? [] : await rowsOf(supabase .from("chat_sessions") .select("id,session_type") .eq("user_id", userId) diff --git a/frontend/tests/credits-groundwork-2057.test.ts b/frontend/tests/credits-groundwork-2057.test.ts index ed0fbee63..338d2a7c4 100644 --- a/frontend/tests/credits-groundwork-2057.test.ts +++ b/frontend/tests/credits-groundwork-2057.test.ts @@ -165,6 +165,10 @@ test("BUG-2057: the ledger route reads as the user, filters by the session's use assert.match(route, new RegExp(`\\.from\\("${table}"\\)[\\s\\S]{0,140}\\.eq\\("user_id", userId\\)`), table); } assert.match(route, /\.from\("redemption_codes"\)[\s\S]{0,140}\.eq\("redeemed_by", userId\)/); + // The service role is revoked on chat_sessions, so that one lookup goes through the user's own client. + assert.match(route, /rowsOf\(supabase\s+\.from\("chat_sessions"\)/); + assert.match(migrations("20260715030000_user_profiles_chat_sessions.sql"), + /revoke all on table public\.chat_sessions from anon, authenticated, service_role;[\s\S]*grant select on table public\.chat_sessions to authenticated;/); // Nothing internal is selected from the ledger. assert.match(route, /\.select\("id,transaction_type,amount,request_id,redemption_code_id,created_at"\)/); assert.doesNotMatch(route, /input_tokens|output_tokens|balance_after|"model"|code_hash|order_no/); diff --git a/frontend/tests/database-credit-ledger-2057.test.ts b/frontend/tests/database-credit-ledger-2057.test.ts index 91f8e047c..b0af6f9db 100644 --- a/frontend/tests/database-credit-ledger-2057.test.ts +++ b/frontend/tests/database-credit-ledger-2057.test.ts @@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ test("a signed-in user reads only their own credit ledger rows and avatar; the s await assert.rejects(user.query("select 1 from public.usage_reservations limit 1"), /permission denied/); await assert.rejects(user.query("select 1 from public.redemption_codes limit 1"), /permission denied/); + // Conversations are the other way round: the signed-in user reads them, the service role cannot. + assert.equal((await user.query("select 1 from public.chat_sessions")).rowCount, 0); + assert.equal(fixture.psql("select has_table_privilege('service_role', 'public.chat_sessions', 'select')"), "f"); + // The uploaded avatar: a user reads, replaces and removes only their own row. const avatarRow = (id: string, version: string) => `('${id}','image/jpeg',decode('ffd8ff','hex'),3,256,256,'${version}')`; @@ -88,11 +92,11 @@ test("a signed-in user reads only their own credit ledger rows and avatar; the s await assert.rejects(user.query(`insert into public.profile_avatar_images${columns} values ${bad}`), /check constraint/); } // The admin console's database role has no access at all. - const adminRole = await service.query("select has_table_privilege('admin_runtime','public.profile_avatar_images','select') as can"); - assert.equal(adminRole.rows[0]?.can, false); + // Asked as the fixture's superuser: a login role without a role set cannot even name the schema. + assert.equal(fixture.psql("select has_table_privilege('admin_runtime', 'public.profile_avatar_images', 'select')"), "f"); await service.query("set role service_role"); - for (const table of ["usage_reservations", "consultation_requests", "personal_reports", "chat_sessions", "redemption_codes"]) { + for (const table of ["usage_reservations", "consultation_requests", "personal_reports", "redemption_codes"]) { const result = await service.query(`select count(*)::int as n from public.${table}`); assert.equal(typeof result.rows[0]?.n, "number", table); } diff --git a/frontend/tests/database-local-business.test.ts b/frontend/tests/database-local-business.test.ts index 8422fea10..494b1e7a4 100644 --- a/frontend/tests/database-local-business.test.ts +++ b/frontend/tests/database-local-business.test.ts @@ -370,6 +370,10 @@ test("local PostgreSQL applies the reviewed business schema and serves authentic "personal_reports", "pricing_experiment_events", "product_entitlements", + // 原值: product_entitlements 之后直接是 profiles + // 新值: 加上 profile_avatar_images + // 原因: BUG-2057 新增用户上传头像的表 + "profile_avatar_images", "profiles", // 原值: profiles 之后直接是 redemption_attempts // 新值: 中间加入 rectification_telemetry 与 rectification_telemetry_reported_cases